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We investigated an outbreak of encephalitis in Tangail
District, Bangladesh. We defined case-patients as persons
from the outbreak area in whom fever developed with new
onset of seizures or altered mental status from December
15, 2004, through January 31, 2005. Twelve persons met
the definition; 11 (92%) died. Serum specimens were avail-
able from 3; 2 had immunoglobulin M antibodies against
Nipah virus by capture enzyme immunoassay. We enrolled
11 case-patients and 33 neighborhood controls in a case-
control study. The only exposure significantly associated
with illness was drinking raw date palm sap (64% among
case-patients vs. 18% among controls, odds ratio [OR] 7.9,
p = 0.01). Fruit bats (Pteropus giganteus) are a nuisance to
date palm sap collectors because the bats drink from the
clay pots used to collect the sap at night. This investigation
suggests that Nipah virus was transmitted from P. gigan-
teus to persons through drinking fresh date palm sap.
N
ipah virus was first recognized in a large human out-
break that affected 283 persons and caused 109 deaths
in Malaysia in 1999 (1,2). The outbreak was preceded by a
large Nipah outbreak among pigs (3). Contact with sick
pigs was the primary risk factor for human Nipah virus
infection (4). The porcine outbreak, in turn, was thought to
be caused by transmission of Nipah virus from fruit bats to
pigs. Antibodies against Nipah virus were identified in the
2 native Pteropus species (5), and the virus was subse-
quently isolated from pooled urine samples from a P.
hypomelanus colony on Tioman Island, Malaysia (6). The
most likely initiating event was that a fruit bat that was
shedding Nipah virus in its saliva dropped a piece of par-
tially eaten fruit into a pig sty, and 1 or more of the pigs
became infected (1,7). Genetic characterization of the
Nipah virus strains isolated from pigs in the Malaysia out-
break identified 2 strains, 1 of which was identified in
humans, and 1 of which may have given rise to the other
through genetic drift (8). These findings suggest that as
few as 1 or 2 instances of spillover of Nipah virus from
bats to pigs occurred. No further cases of Nipah virus have
been reported in Malaysia since 1999.
Four outbreaks of Nipah virus have been recognized in
central and west Bangladesh from 2001 through 2004
(9–11) (Figure 1). Each outbreak occurred between
January and May. Different outbreaks have been associat-
ed with different exposures. In the first outbreak in
Meherpur in 2001, Nipah case-patients were significantly
more likely to have had contact with a sick cow and con-
tact with the secretions of an ill person than were controls
(9). In Naogaon in 2003, case-patients were more likely
than controls to have had contact with a herd of pigs that
had passed through the area before the outbreak (12). In
the 2004 outbreak in Goalando, Nipah case-patients were
significantly more likely to have climbed trees and to have
had contact with ill persons than were controls (13). In the
2004 outbreak in Faridpur, contact with ill persons was the
primary risk for human Nipah disease (10).
Substantial data implicate flying foxes (Pteropus spp.)
as the natural reservoir of Nipah virus. Investigations of
Pteropus spp. in Malaysia, Cambodia, and Thailand have
consistently identified antibodies against Nipah virus (5,
14–16). It has been isolated from Pteropus spp. bats in
Malaysia, Cambodia, and Thailand (6,15,16). P. giganteus
is the only Pteropus species present in Bangladesh. In the
Naogaon investigation, 2 of 19 P. giganteus specimens had
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from various species had Nipah antibodies (9). Strains of
Nipah virus isolated from affected persons in Bangladesh
have substantial genetic diversity (17). The repeated out-
breaks in Bangladesh and the genetic diversity of Nipah
virus isolated from affected persons in Bangladesh suggest
substantial diversity of the virus in the wildlife reservoir
and repeated spillover of the virus from its reservoir to the
human population.
On January 11, 2005, government health workers in
Tangail District reported that 8 previously healthy persons
from Basail Upazila (subdistrict) had died within the pre-
ceding week from an illness characterized by fever and
mental status changes. The Institute for Epidemiology
Disease Control and Research (IEDCR) of the government
of Bangladesh immediately launched an investigation and
5 days later invited the International Centre for Diarrheal
Disease Research, Bangladesh (ICDDRB) to assist. The
objectives of the investigation were to determine the cause
of the outbreak, identify risk factors for development of ill-
ness, and develop strategies for prevention.
Methods
Case Identification
From January 11 onward, government health workers at
the Basail Health Center recorded the names and basic
clinical information and collected a blood sample from all
patients who sought treatment for fever, seizures, or men-
tal status changes. They followed up each ill person at least
once per week until he or she recovered. Government
health authorities and hospital medical directors in sur-
rounding areas were notified of the outbreak and encour-
aged to contact the IEDCR if any patients with symptoms
of encephalitis from Tangail District sought treatment in a
healthcare institution outside of the district. Basail Upazila
is composed of 6 unions. Ultimately, the study team
defined a case-patient with outbreak-associated encephali-
tis as a person who lived or traveled in Habla Union, Basail
Upazila, Tangail District, Bangladesh, in whom a fever
developed and who had new onset of seizures or altered
mental status between December 15, 2004, and January
31, 2005.
In-Depth Interviews
An experienced anthropology team conducted in-depth
interviews with the families of each case-patient. The
objectives were 1) to explore potentially relevant expo-
sures; 2) to assist in framing questions for the case-control
questionnaire within the context of the activities, under-
standing, and language of local residents; and 3) to identi-
fy appropriate proxy respondents for each case-patient.
Topics covered in the interviews included details on expo-
sure to ill or dead persons; purchase and consumption of
date palm sap; contact with animals, especially sick ani-
mals; availability and consumption of locally grown fruits,
vegetables, and flowering plants; and presence and behav-
ior of fruit bats in the area. The anthropology team inter-
viewed collectors of date palm sap in detail about the
context and process of date palm sap collection, prepara-
tion of the sap for consumption, and sales and distribution
of the sap.
Case-Control Study
On the basis of the findings from the in-depth study, a
closed-ended questionnaire was developed and translated
into Bengali. Five interviewers with extensive prior expe-
rience in administering close-ended questionnaires were
trained in a 2-day course on a standardized method to
request informed consent and administer the questionnaire.
The interviewers then pretested the questionnaire in the
presence of supervisors on a sample population from a
nearby village that was not included in the study. After
final revisions, the interviewers administered the question-
naire to each case-patient or his or her proxy(ies). Controls
were identified by visiting the next closest house to the
case-patient, confirming that no one in the house met the
case definition, identifying the household resident closest
in age to the case-patient, and then seeking consent to
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Figure 1. Location and dates of confirmed Nipah virus outbreaks
in and near Bangladesh.administer the questionnaire. Only 1 control was enrolled
per household. If the household resident closest in age to
the case-patient declined to participate in the study, no
other person in the household was sought as a control. This
process was repeated at the next closest household until 3
controls were enrolled for each case-patient.
Proxy respondents were identified for each case-patient
who had died or was unable to respond. Proxy respondents
included spouses, family members, and friends. Multiple
proxy respondents were common; for example, a neigh-
borhood playmate could be aware of food exposures that a
parent might not be.
Mapping
We measured the location of key features in the out-
break by using global positioning system sensing. We then
superimposed these locations on publicly available gov-
ernment maps. 
Laboratory Methods
Whole blood specimens were transported on wet ice to
the laboratory at ICDDRB, where they were centrifuged;
the separated serum was stored at –70°C. Serum samples
were shipped on dry ice to the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) and tested with an immunoglobulin
M (IgM) capture enzyme immunoassay (EIA) that detects
Nipah IgM antibodies and an indirect EIA for Nipah IgG
antibodies (18). Nipah (Malaysia prototype) virus antigen
was used in both assays.
Statistics
We used odds ratios to estimate the association of each
exposure with disease. To assess whether observations
departed from what would be expected by chance, we used
the χ2 test when expected cell sizes were >5 and the Fisher
exact test when expected cell sizes were <5. We calculated
exact mid-p 95% confidence limits around the odds ratio.
We used an unmatched analysis because neighbors were
chosen as controls to ensure that controls arose from the
same population as case-patients and not to control for
confounding factors. Indeed, all case-patients and controls
lived within the same area. We enrolled persons closest in
age, not to control confounding by age but rather to pro-
vide simple guidelines to the interviewers that would pre-
vent the common tendency to disproportionately enroll
heads of households. Only 1 exposure was significantly
associated with illness in the initial analysis. To account
for the lack of independence among the exposures of the 3
case-patients that occurred in the same household, we used
a generalized estimating equations model with an
exchangeable correlation matrix (19).
Ethics
The investigation team developed messages based on
evidence from prior outbreaks on what steps family mem-
bers could take to prevent person-to-person transmission of
Nipah virus. During the outbreak, government health work-
ers actively disseminated these messages. In addition, at the
end of each in-depth interview carried out by the anthropol-
ogy team, messages on steps to prevent person-to-person
transmission of Nipah virus were directly communicated to
case-patient families. Informed consent was requested of
all study participants or their proxies. Because an emer-
gency outbreak investigation was being conducted, the pro-
tocol was not reviewed by a human subjects committee.
Results
Government health workers identified 124 persons
within the outbreak area in whom fever developed during
January 2005. Of these, 12 persons met the outbreak-asso-
ciated encephalitis case definition. Among case-patients,
the most common accompanying symptom was lack of
consciousness (Table 1). The patients’ median age was 16
years (range 5–85 years); 7 (58%) were male. Eleven
(92%) of the persons who met the case definition died.
Death occurred a median of 5 days (range 4–9 days) after
the first symptom of illness was reported.
The onset of illness for all of the case-patients occurred
within 17 days, and all but the last case occurred after 10
days (Figure 2). All of the case-patients lived within 8 km
of each other (Figure 3). Three cases occurred in a single
household.
Serum specimens were collected from 3 persons who
met the outbreak-associated encephalitis case definition
(Table 2). Two case-patients had IgM antibodies against
Nipah virus by capture EIA. These 2 case-patients had
blood collected 8 and 17 days after illness onset. The
patient without detectable IgM antibody had his blood col-
lected 2 days after illness onset. Both patients with IgM
antibody also had Nipah IgG antibodies detected. Serum
was also collected from 20 residents of the outbreak-
affected community who had fever but did not meet the
outbreak-associated encephalitis case definition. All 20 of
these specimens were negative for Nipah IgM and IgG
antibodies.
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Interviewers enrolled 11 patients who met the outbreak-
associated encephalitis case definition and 33 matched
controls. One patient was excluded because we could not
identify proxy respondents with thorough knowledge of
his exposures. Proxy respondents were used for all case-
patient interviews and for 6 (17%) control interviews.
The only exposure that was significantly associated
with illness was drinking raw date palm sap (64% among
cases versus 18% among controls, odds ratio [OR] 7.9, p =
0.01, Table 3). Of the 13 persons who reported consuming
date palm sap, 11 knew the location where the sap had
been harvested. Ten (91%) reported that the sap was har-
vested from a single village. None of the study participants
were harvesters of date palm sap; none reported drinking
the date palm sap directly from the collection container.
A greater proportion of case-patients than controls
reported physical contact with sick animals, although this
difference may have been due to chance (36% vs. 12%, OR
4.1, p = 0.09). Two case-patients had contact with a sick
hen, 1 with a sick cat, and 1 with a sick sheep. None of the
44 case-patients or controls reported physical contact with
pigs or fruit bats, and none had eaten bats. Case-patients
were no more likely than controls to have climbed trees or
to have had contact with ill persons who later died. In the
general estimated equation model that adjusted for the 3
cases clustered in the same household, drinking raw date
palm sap was significantly associated with illness (adjusted
OR 5.6, 95% confidence limits 1.7–7.9, p = 0.03).
Qualitative Findings
Date palm sap collectors explained that harvesting is a
seasonal occupation that, in this region, begins in mid-
December with the first cold night and continues through
mid-February. At the beginning of the season, the bark is
shaved off on 1 side of the tree (Phoenix sylvestris) near
the top in a V shape, and a small hollow bamboo tap is
placed at the base of the V. In the late afternoon, date palm
sap collectors climb the tree, scrape the area where the
bark is denuded so the sap can flow freely, and tie a 2- to
4-L clay pot under the tap. During the night, as the palm
sap rises to the top of the tree, some leaks out where the
bark is denuded, flows through the tap, and drips into the
clay pot. Palm sap collectors climb the trees between 5:00
A.M. and 6:00 A.M. to gather the clay pots.
The date palm sap from the individual clay pots typical-
ly contains 1–3 L of sap from a single tree; this sap is
poured into a larger metal 22-L aluminum vessel with sap
from several trees. Sellers will typically first walk to vil-
lages near where they collected the sap and either sell it
door to door or from the road. If they still have some
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Figure 2. Dates of Illness onset, encephalitis outbreak, Habla
Union, Bangladesh. 
Figure 3. Outbreak area, Habla Union,
Basail Upazila. remaining, they will go to the market to sell it. Some buy-
ers cook the sap to make molasses or special deserts; some
is consumed fresh. Customers typically bring their own
glass or jar, and the date palm sap seller dispenses the sap
from the larger container. Fresh sap has to be sold early in
the morning; otherwise, the sap will ferment and no longer
taste sweet. The market price for fresh date palm sap was
8–10 taka (US $0.14–$0.17) per liter before 10:00 AM and
4–5 taka (US $0.07–$0.09) after 10:00 AM.
Owners of date palm trees reported that they often hear
bats at night. Owners viewed the fruit bats as a nuisance
because they frequently drink the palm sap directly from
the tap or the clay pot. Bat excrement is commonly found
on the outside of the clay pot or floating in the sap.
Occasionally dead bats are found floating in the pots.
One of the Nipah case-patients who died was the son of
a date palm sap collector. The collector harvested sap from
his own date palm trees that grew in his household com-
pound, as well from other trees in the area. The collector
reported that he had recently heard bats near his trees at
night and noted signs of bat excrement in and outside of
the clay pot used to collect the sap. His son had been con-
suming date palm sap on a daily basis since the start of the
season. Several days before the outbreak, the date palm sap
collector sent a gift of fresh palm sap to his relatives living
in a nearby homestead. Encephalitis developed in 3 mem-
bers of the recipient household; 2 died.
Discussion
This outbreak was almost certainly caused by infection
with Nipah virus. The tight clustering of cases in time and
space suggests a single etiologic agent. The clinical signs
and symptoms of fever, central nervous system involve-
ment, and rapid progression to death are consistent with
other Nipah outbreaks in Bangladesh. The outbreak
occurred in the same region and during the same time of
year as the 4 prior confirmed Nipah outbreaks in
Bangladesh. Finally, 2 of 3 persons who met the outbreak-
associated encephalitis case definition and were able to
provide a serum specimen had IgM antibodies against
Nipah virus. The single outbreak-associated specimen that
was IgM negative was drawn from a patient on day 2 after
symptom onset, so IgM antibodies may not have been
present in sufficient quantity to be detected (20).
Date palm sap was the likely vehicle of transmission for
most of the Nipah virus infections in this outbreak.
Drinking fresh, raw date palm sap was the sole exposure
significantly associated with illness. Moreover, date palm
sap is a biologically plausible vehicle. Although fruit bats
uncommonly shed Nipah virus (5,21), when infected they
can shed virus in both saliva and urine (5,15,16). Nipah
virus can survive for days in fruit juice or flying-fox urine
(22). Since date palm sap is sold and consumed within a
few hours of collection, consumers could ingest infectious
virus.
This outbreak provides further evidence that Nipah
virus infection in humans in Bangladesh is a seasonal dis-
ease that results from interaction between P. giganteus
fruit bats and humans. This is the fifth Nipah outbreak in 5
years that has been identified in the same region (Figure
1). ANipah outbreak also was confirmed in Siliguri, India,
15 km north of the border with Bangladesh in January
2001 (23). Each of these outbreaks occurred between
January and May. P. giganteus is widely distributed
throughout Bangladesh (24). The reason the outbreaks are
occurring in this region at this time of year may be related
to a seasonal increase in Nipah virus shedding among P.
giganteus or to P. giganteus’attraction to particular natural
or agricultural foods that are seasonally available in this
region and bring the bats into proximity with humans.
An important limitation of this investigation is that only
3 serum samples were available from case-patients. Thus,
some persons included in the outbreak may not have had
Nipah virus infection. Misclassifying non–case-patients as
case-patients would bias the odds ratio toward null.
A second limitation is that proxy interviews were
required to obtain exposure information for all case-patient
interviews. In addition, the same population was used for
in-depth interviews and for follow-up quantitative ques-
tionnaires. Thus, information bias is possible. However,
proxy respondents were independently identified by the
qualitative research team to ensure that only persons who
directly observed the case-patients’exposures were includ-
ed. The standardized questionnaire used for the case-con-
trol study was pretested. The interviewers were unaware of
the study hypothesis, and respondents were encouraged to
answer to the best of their knowledge. Discrepancies were
found between the in-depth interviews and the quantitative
studies. Three proxy respondents who unambiguously
reported consuming date palm sap during the initial in-
depth qualitative interview reported no consumption dur-
ing the follow-up close-ended interview. These 3 persons
were relatives of a date palm sap collector. Their answers
to the case-control questionnaire were used in the analysis.
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some of the investigation team’s hypotheses were; howev-
er, this factor apparently biased the data against finding an
association with date palm sap. Indeed, none of these
sources of bias were likely to produce a spurious associa-
tion between disease and raw date palm sap consumption.
A third limitation is that Nipah virus was not isolated
from date palm sap. Indeed, by the time the investigation
implicated date palm sap, transmission of Nipah virus was
no longer occurring in the area, and we did not collect date
palm sap samples. However, the evidence favoring date
palm juice as the vehicle for transmission of Nipah virus in
this outbreak is stronger than for any alternative hypothesis.
This study highlights the value of a diverse outbreak
investigation team. Clinicians identified and cared for ill
patients. Experts in qualitative research collaborated with
the epidemiology team to understand potential routes of
exposure and then used in-depth discussion with affected
community residents to identify locally relevant exposures
and frame the questions for the quantitative investigation.
By conversing with residents of the affected area, qualita-
tive investigators corrected outsiders’ misconceptions
about local exposures and were also able to quickly devel-
op locally relevant messages to prevent secondary trans-
mission. Laboratory investigators confirmed the cause of
the outbreak. A close working relationship between gov-
ernment health workers and researchers permitted shared
access to relevant information that provided government
authorities with information on how to manage the out-
break and prevent further transmission.
Investigation of different Nipah outbreaks in
Bangladesh have identified different routes of transmission
including climbing trees, contact with sick persons, and
contact with sick animals (9–13). This investigation iden-
tifies another way that Nipah virus may be transmitted
from P. giganteus to humans in Bangladesh. Fresh date
palm sap is a national delicacy that is enjoyed by millions
of Bangladeshis each winter. Apparently, most servings of
fresh date palm sap are safe to drink. However, this inves-
tigation suggests that, at least occasionally, the sap
Foodborne Transmission of Nipah Virus
Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 12, No. 12, December 2006 1893contains a sufficient dose of Nipah virus to be fatal to
humans. Further research to define how frequently this
occurs is important. Persons who want to avoid ingesting
Nipah virus from this route, should avoid drinking raw
date palm sap. Low-cost interventions to restrict access of
fruit bats to date palm taps and pots and that make fresh
date palm sap safer should be developed and evaluated. In
addition, continued research to better understand Nipah
virus transmission between bats and the multiple pathways
of human infection are important for developing sound
prevention strategies.
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